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We extend Bresnahan and Reiss’s (1991) model of local oligopoly to allow firm entry and exit over time. 
In our framework, entrants have to incur sunk costs in order to enter a market. After becoming 
incumbents, they disregard these entry costs in deciding whether to continue operating or to exit. We 
apply this framework to study market structure and competitive conduct in local markets for high-speed 
Internet service from 1999 to 2003. Replication of Bresnahan and Reiss’s framework generates 
unreasonable variation in firms’ competitive conduct over time. This variation disappears when entry 
costs are allowed. We find that once the market has one to three firms, the next entrant has little effect on 
competitive conduct. We also find that entry costs vary with the order of entry, especially for early 
entrants. Our findings highlight the importance of sunk costs in determining entry conditions and 
inferences about firm conduct. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
  Economists have long held that firms’ market power to set price above marginal cost is inversely 
related to the number of firms competing in the market. However, it has been a serious challenge to 
establish the number of competing firms necessary to eliminate market power. Lack of data on prices, 
quantities, product characteristics, and cost structures makes it difficult to separate out the demand, 
technologic, and strategic factors determining firms’ entry, exit, and pricing decisions. 
  A solution proposed in a series of prominent papers by Bresnahan and Reiss (1987, 1990, and 
1991) is to use entry threshold ratios to measure changes in firms’ competitive conduct as the number of 
competing firms increases across markets. If the first entrant has monopoly power to charge a high price, 
it can recover fixed entry and production costs with a relatively small number of units sold or customers 
served. As additional firms enter, their power to set price may diminish relative to the first entrant. In this 
scenario, as prices fall, a larger number of units or customers served is needed in order to recover the 
fixed costs. A greater market size increase is then necessary to induce the second entrant than was needed 
to induce the first entrant. An even larger market size increase is necessary to induce the third entrant than 
the second, and so on. Once entry thresholds stabilize with additional entrants, one can presume that 
competitive pricing conditions have been satisfied. 
Since its coining, the entry threshold ratio concept has become enormously influential in the field 
of empirical industrial organization. Subsequent researchers further developed this methodology of 
combining a reduced-form profit function with a game theoretic model of entry and competition.
1 
However, the Bresnahan and Reiss (henceforth BR) method has some limitations that restrict its use to 
certain types of markets. First, the procedure is best suited to geographically distinct local service markets 
                                                 
1 The main effort has been restoring differences among firms back into the model, which Bresnahan and Reiss 
abstract away. Berry (1992) incorporates heterogeneous potential entrants in his study of the airline market. Reiss 
(1996) discusses the modeling and computational issues in this type of multiple-agent qualitative response model. 
Toivanen and Waterson (2000, 2004) examine the UK fast food market in a Stackelberg theoretical framework.  
Mazzeo et al (2002, 2003, and 2004) introduce product differentiation into the BR framework in studies of motel, 
HMO, and telecommunication markets. Danis (2003) makes use of the identities of local exchanges in analyzing the 
equity option market. Seim (2004) estimates an entry model with location choices in the video retail industry.   2
so that researchers can clearly define market boundaries. However, mobile populations may be willing to 
drive a considerable distance to access some service providers such as health practitioners or auto dealers, 
making it difficult to pin down the exact number of firms operating in the local market. Second, 
researchers often find that threshold ratios vary significantly across industries, implying large differences 
in competitive conduct across industries.
2 While differences in sunk costs or regulatory environment 
across industries offer possible explanations, these large differences in threshold ratios may suggest more 
variation in competitive conduct than actually exists. The most important limitation is that the BR 
empirical framework is based on cross sectional observations of markets in equilibrium. It is not clear that 
the framework applies equally well to markets facing rapid entry or exit.  
Using time series observations of zip-code-level local markets for providers of high-speed lines 
for Internet access, we seek to further the line of research initiated by Bresnahan and Reiss. The 
commercial provision of broadband services has expanded rapidly since 1998. Like other 
telecommunication industries, the competitive conduct of this thriving market has always been subject to 
scrutiny. This study will address the following questions: What factors encourage or deter provider entry? 
How many providers must exist in a market to ensure effective competition? Do entry conditions and 
competitive conduct vary over time? Do entry costs vary with the order of entry? 
  We extend the BR framework by exploiting the rich information provided by the entry and exit 
patterns over time. Specifically, we allow two types of firms operating in a market at any given time: 
entrants (who did not exist in the previous period) and incumbents (who can plan either to stay for the 
next period or to exit at the end of this period). We then link these firms’ decisions regarding entry, 
continuation or exit to market size variations. New entrants, who incur sunk costs in order to enter a 
market, will only enter when market size has grown enough to cover their entry costs.  Incumbent firms, 
however, do not take entry costs into consideration when deciding whether to continue operations or exit. 
                                                 
2 For example, Bresnahan and Reiss (1987) show quite remarkable differences in entry threshold ratios between 
professional and retail industries.    3
This distinction allows us to identify entry costs by comparing the entry thresholds for markets which 
have experienced entry or exit to entry thresholds for markets experiencing no entry or exit. Estimates 
from our model are also able to evaluate how competitive conduct changes as the number of providers 
increases in a local broadband market. Temporal variation in estimated entry thresholds will help us to 
determine the magnitude of demand growth and/or technologic improvement in these markets and how 
competitive conduct changes over time.  
The results of our adapted framework are striking. Results from replicating the BR framework 
imply that entry conditions vary dramatically over time for the 4
th firm entering a 1-to-3 firm oligopoly 
market. In particular, entry conditions become increasingly more difficult for the 4
th firm over time. This 
unreasonable variation in entry conditions disappears when the estimation accommodates entry and exit. 
Entry conditions for the 4
th firm and on are stable, implying that new firm entrants beyond the first three 
firms have little effect on competitive conduct. We also find that entry costs for early entrants are smaller 
than for later entrants, implying the existence of early mover advantages in this market. Overall, our 
results imply that sunk costs are a main determinant of entry thresholds. Ignoring sunk costs leads to 
biased measures of entry thresholds and misleading inferences about firms’ competitive conduct.  
The idea of using entry and exit thresholds to measure the importance of sunk costs was first used 
by Bresnahan and Reiss in a 1993 article published in Annales D’Economie Et De Statistique.  They use 
1980 and 1988 data on the location of rural dentists to estimate entry and exit thresholds. Finding 
dentists’ exit thresholds well below their entry thresholds, they conclude that sunk costs play a significant 
role in dentists’ entry decisions. While data limitations forced their empirical model to fall short of their 
desired fully dynamic model with forward-looking firms,
3 their paper does illustrate that sunk costs can 
have large effects on estimated thresholds when analyzing market entry and exit decisions.  However, the 
                                                 
3 Bresnahan and Reiss build a highly stylized two-period model, in which firms are forward-looking to the demand 
and competitive conditions in the next period. However, they only have two years of data, 1980 and 1988. In the 
actual estimation, they have to treat the first period as a static reduced form as they do not know the entry patterns 
for the first period. They also constrain the number of firms in a hypothetical third period to be the same as in 1988 
because they lack data for a third period.    4
numerous papers that extended the BR framework to other settings have not followed the path suggested 
by their 1993 paper. Our study is an effort to revive that approach. Moreover, our adapted BR framework 
streamlines a complicated dynamic model to simplify the application and make the identification more 
transparent. Our results confirm that sunk costs can greatly alter the conclusions derived from the original 
BR estimation strategy to measure entry threshold ratios, and support the use of the dynamic extensions 
of the BR framework to generate accurate assessments of industry competitive environment. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 recapitulates the BR framework and describes our 
methodology. Section 3 introduces the broadband market and the data we use. Section 4 presents 
empirical results for the replication of the BR model, our baseline model, and its extensions. Section 5 
concludes. 
 
2.  METHODOLOGY 
2.1  The Bresnahan and Reiss Framework 
  Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) relate shifts in market demand to changes in the equilibrium number 
of firms. Their method works best with personal service industries where there is a one-to-one 
correspondence between local population and sales. In their model, each firm’s profit is defined as the 
difference between its variable profits and its fixed operating cost.
4 To induce one more firm to enter a 
market, market size as proxied by the population has to rise so that variable profits generated by the 
increase can cover fixed operating costs. Suppose the population must increase by  n s  to support the entry 
of the 
th n firm while it takes an additional  1 n s +  to support entry of the 
st n 1 +  firm. If the fixed operating 
costs remain the same for all entrants, then the change from  n s  to  1 n s +  tells us how quickly firms’ 
variable profits fall as an additional firm enters. For instance, if the population increase necessary to 
induce entry of the 2
nd firm is 4 times that necessary to induce entry of the 1
st firm, then firms’ variable 
                                                 
4 Note that fixed operating costs are not sunk costs ---- sunk entry costs do not play a role in the static BR model.   5
profits and competitive conduct must have changed drastically in moving from a monopoly to a duopoly 





+  measures the change in competitive conduct as market 





+  will be constant over time provided there is no 
change in market competitive conduct, entry and production costs change uniformly across firms, and 
there is no change in minimum efficient scale.
5 
The BR framework is applied to local service markets such as doctors, dentists, and pharmacists, 
markets with stable demand and negligible growth rates. In such cases, cross sectional variation in the 
number of competitors across localities will show how variation in market structure affects competitive 
conduct. Unclear is whether we can safely apply the BR framework to an alternative market characterized 
by significant entry and exit. In this study, we explore the application of the BR framework to such a 
market and compare the results to an adaptation of the BR framework that accommodates firm entry and 
exit. 
 
2.2   Baseline  Model 
  Ericson and Pakes (1995) propose an empirical framework of firm and industry dynamics 
allowing for entry, exit, firm heterogeneity, and idiosyncratic shocks. Their model requires detailed firm-
level data over several time periods. Our market-level data are not sufficiently detailed to apply their 
framework.
6 We observe the net change of the number of firms in a local market over time, but we cannot 
identify individual firms or obtain any firm-specific information. By exploiting the temporal entry and 
                                                 
5 See Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) section II for how entry threshold ratios change with minimum efficient scale in a 
Cournot oligopoly model.  
6 Aguirregabiria and Mira (2002), Bajari and Hong (2005), Pakes, Ostrovsky, and Berry (2004) provide 
simplifications along this line in order to alleviate the computational burden of estimating a discrete dynamic game, 
but the data requirement is similar.   6
exit patterns of the industry, however, we can infer information about market structure and competitive 
conduct beyond the capabilities of the BR framework.  
At any given time, a snap shot of a growing market consists of new entrants and incumbents. 
There is a key difference between the two firm types. When there are sunk entry costs, it takes less 
demand to sustain an incumbent than to support a new entrant. A firm enters the market when its expected 
discounted value of future profits ---- profits defined as variable profits net of fixed operating costs ---- 
exceeds entry costs. An incumbent firm continues operation when its expected discounted value of future 
profits exceeds zero, and exits the market otherwise. The purpose of the theory below is to show how 
firms’ decisions regarding entry, continuation and exit, conditional on local demand and thus expected 
future profitability, will allow us to infer the magnitude of entry costs and their roles in determining entry 
threshold ratios.  
In time period t, there are n   (0 ) nN ≤ ≤ firms active in market m . Market demand is 
stochastic. At the end of each time period, all firms including potential entrants decide whether to operate 
in the next period based on expected market demand, technological change, and competition with other 
firms. In equilibrium, firms’ expectations are realized. Profits differ between entrants and incumbents 
because entrants have to incur sunk costs to enter while incumbents do not consider these costs when 
deciding what to do next. This setup assumes away simultaneous entry and exit, as our market level data 
cannot identify that occurrence anyway.
7  
We adopt a reduced form profit function for its tractability. The 
th n  potential entrant considering 
entering market m  with  1 n −  firms at time t has an expected discounted value of future profits of 
, **
Ep o p
nm t m t m t n t t m t Pop X SC β βµ ε Π= + −− +. After becoming an incumbent, this 
th n  firm has 
expected discounted value of future profits of  , **
I pop
nm t m t m t n t m t Pop X β βµ ε Π= + −+ if it continues 
                                                 
7 We can introduce a firm-level idiosyncratic shock on profitability to account for the fact that firms simultaneously 
enter and exit a market. Then we can aggregate over the shocks to derive market-average firm profit. But as our data 
is at aggregate market level, there is no gain in our empirical investigation by doing so.    7
operating in market m  at time t. The difference between the two profit functions is that entry costs  t SC  
no longer apply to incumbents. 
In the above formulations,  m Pop  is the population of market m , and m X contains other market-
level variables that might affect each firm’s variable profits and fixed operating costs. Market size as 
measured by population is the key element, as in the BR study and their follow-ups. In the broadband 
market, plausible elements of  m X  include local demographic variables such as gender, race, age and 




t β  and  t β  measures how firms’ time-varying expectations about a market’s profitability are 
determined by  m Pop  and  m X . For example, in 1999 a market with 1000 people might not be expected to 
generate sufficient demand for a single provider of high-speed lines; in 2003 the same 1000 people might 
be able to support two or more. Time-varying 
pop
t β  and  t β  capture changes over time in consumer taste 
and/or technology improvements.  nt µ  is the (expected and realized) effect on per-firm variable profits of 
the 
th n  firm entering the market at time t.  t SC  measures the time-varying entry costs, which are sunk 
with the entry of the firm.  t SC , more accurately, is the difference between the actual costs of entry and 
the expected future sell-off values. Here we normalize the expected future sell-off values to zero. For now 
we assume all entrants incur the same entry costs regardless of the order of entry, but we will relax this 
assumption in an extension to this baseline model.  mt ε  are market- and time-specific noises affecting 
firms’ expected discounted value of entry or continuation, which are identically and independently 
distributed with:
2 (0, ) mt N ε ε σ ∼ . The i.i.d. assumption about  mt ε  will also be relaxed in an extension to 
this baseline model.  
In the data, when we observe n  firms in market m at time t , there are three situations: 
                                                 
8 Section 3 will offer a detailed discussion on the components of m X .   8
1)  One or more firms have entered and there were fewer than n  firms at time  1 t − . For the 
th n firm, 
the expected discounted value of entry exceeds zero, while for the 
st n 1 + firm it is negative. This can be 
expressed as:  ,1 , 0& 0
EE
nm t n m t + Π> Π < . 
2)   No firm has entered or exited a market with n  firms. All n  incumbent firms from period  1 t −  
have decided to stay because their expected discounted values of continuation exceed 0, while the 
st n 1 + firm has expected a loss from entry. That is:  ,1 , 0& 0
IE
nm t n m t + Π >Π < . 
3)   One or more firms have exited and there were more than n  firms at time  1 t − . The market has 
become unprofitable when more than n  firms stayed operating. Firm-level idiosyncratic shocks decide 
which firms to exit. The marginal firm, the 
st n 1 + one, expected that it would be unprofitable to stay in 
the market; when this firm left, the rest of the n  incumbent firms expected otherwise. That is: 
,1 , 0& 0
II
nm t n m t + Π> Π < . 
Define  mt N  to be the observed number of firms in market m  at time t. The following 
econometric model can nest the above three situations:  
1,
()
(* * * [ ] )
(* * * [ ]* [ ] )
(, [ ] , [ ] ; ) ,
mt
pop
mt mt n t t m t
pop
mt mt n t t m t t m t
mm t m t
prob N n
Pop X SC I entry
Pop X SC I entry SC I Incumbent






=Φ + − −
−Φ + − − −
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where  [] mt I entry  and  [] mt I Incumbent  are indicator functions. The definitions of these two indicator 
functions are: 
[] 1 mt Ie n t r y =  if market m  had less than n  firms at time  1 t − ;  [] 0 mt Ie n t r y =  otherwise.  
[] 1 mt I Incumbent =  if market m  had n  firms at time  1 t − ;  [] 0 mt I Incumbent =  otherwise.   9
In the above econometric model, the parameter vector is  [, , ,]
pop
tt n t t SC θββ µ = .
9 We then 
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Define  nt S  to be the necessary population to support the total of n  firms in a local market at time 
t. Also define  nt s  to be the necessary population to support the entry of the 
th n firm. With the estimates 
  θ  and the entrants’ expected payoff function, we can calculate  nt S  by 
     
 








= , where 
m X  is the cross-market average of  m X . Naturally, we calculate entry threshold for the 
th n  firm by 
/ nt nt sS n = , and entry threshold ratios from n  to  1 n +  firms by 








The BR framework is a special case of our 3-case scenario. In the markets BR studied, all firms 
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Even if the BR model admits entry costs, it cannot distinguish  t SC  from  1, nt µ +  because there are no 
measures of entry costs.
10  
In contrast, our model allows identification of the entry costs without relying on explicit measures 
of entry costs. The identification comes from the variation in entry and exit patterns across markets and 
                                                 
9 The variance of  mt ε , 
2
ε σ , is normalized to unity as is typical when the dependant variable is discrete. We also 
normalize the constant term in  * mt X β  to be zero as it is not identified from the cutoff points  nt µ .  
10 Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) have some market-level measures of fixed operating costs, but these are not the same 
as entry costs.   10
across time. As shown in Figure 1, the distances from  nt µ  to  nt t SC µ + , from  nt t SC µ +  to  1, nt µ + , and 
from  1, nt µ +  to  1, nt t SC µ + + , are now estimable by comparing the demand thresholds inducing the 
th n  
firm to enter, forcing the 
st n 1 + firm to exit, and sustaining n  firms to stay.  
It is useful to offer a broader interpretation on how sunk costs will affect firm strategic entry 
decisions. In the most straightforward way, sunk costs are “necessary” investment costs for entrants to 
start businesses. However, there are at least two other potential components of sunk costs. First, 
incumbents’ strategic behavior, e.g. preemption and entry barriers, may lower the entrants’ expected 
discounted future profits. In this situation, potential entrants will delay entry as if there were higher sunk 
costs to enter.
11 Second, the costs consumers face in switching  from incumbents to the new entrant, 
which are especially important in telecommunication industries, may also create disadvantages for later 
entrants. These disadvantages will, again, delay entry as if there were higher sunk costs for later entrants. 
We cannot distinguish between these different types of sunk costs empirically, but our framework will be 
able to measure whether there is a difference in expected profitability between entrants and incumbents 
consistent with the potential differences in sunk costs faced by early and late entrants. 
 
2.3  Extension 1: Allow Entry Costs to Vary With the Order of Entry 
  As just discussed, we are not able to exactly distinguish between the “necessary” and the 
“strategic” sunk costs. However, we can allow entry costs to vary with the order of entry in the hope of 
capturing the differences in sunk costs between early and later entrants. The expected discounted value of 
future payoffs for the 
th n  firm entering market m  at time t is now 
, **
Ep o p
nm t m t m t n t n t m t Pop X SC β βµ ε Π= + −− +. Note that entry costs vary with the order of entry, as 
embodied by subscript n  in  nt SC . Accordingly, we have:  
                                                 
11 Baumol et al. (1982) point out that “the need to sink costs can be a barrier to entry” because incumbents may 
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2.4    Extension 2: Incorporate Market Random Effects 
  In our baseline model, we estimate the parameters period by period, allowing them to vary with 
time. While this allows firms’ expected discounted values of future payoffs to be flexibly determined,
12 
we lose the ability to control for unmeasured market-level heterogeneity, which may be an important 
factor determining entry and exit. A potential solution is to estimate a market random effects model, while 
the market can be at county level. That is, we introduce a market-specific error term in the profit 
functions. For example, firms offering services in the same country may be subject to a county-specific 
shock. Thus a modification of our baseline model is: 
    , **
Ep o p
n mt m t m t nt t county mt Pop X SC ββ µ η ε Π= + −− + + 
    , **
Ip o p
n mt m t m t nt county mt Pop X ββ µ η ε Π= + −+ +. 
  county η  is a time-invariant mean zero error with: 
__
2
cov[ , | ]
var[ | ] _ _ ;
0.
county i county j m
county m county
X






  Estimation of this model involves greater computational burden than the baseline model because 
the likelihood function involves integration over the market random effects  county η . We use the method of 
simulated maximum likelihood to estimate this model. 
 
                                                 
12 A less flexible way is to force β  to be the same for all time periods and use time dummies to pick up demand 
fluctuations.    12
3.  THE BROADBAND MARKET AND THE DATA 
3.1  The Broadband Market 
  Privatization of the Internet in 1994 opened the door to its commercial use and to competition 
among Internet service providers. Over the decade since, the market for providers of high-speed lines has 
grown rapidly. The number of high-speed lines increased 10 fold from 2.8 million in December 1999 to 
28.2 million in December 2003, the sample for which we have data.
13 The vast majority of these lines 
served residential and small business subscribers.
14 This sample period dates back almost to the birth of 
the market. The FCC (2000) estimates that only 0.3% of households had broadband service in 1998. By 
the end of 2003, 21% of U.S. households had broadband access. The total number of providers of high-
speed lines has increased from 105 in December 1999 to 432 in December 2003. By December 2003, 
93% of zip codes encompassing 99% of the country’s population had at least one provider of high-speed 
lines, compared to 60% of zip codes in December 1999. Clearly, the market structure for the broadband 
industry was evolving rapidly. 
Providers of high-speed lines provide broadband services by means of several mutually exclusive 
types of technology. The two major types are asymmetric digital subscriber lines (DSL)
15 and cable 
modems using hybrid fiber-coaxial cable networks, operated primarily by cable television operators.
16 As 
of December 2003, coaxial cable has accounted for 58.3% of all high-speed lines, while DSL has 
accounted for 33.7%. Cable television companies, incumbent local telephone companies (incumbent local 
exchange carriers, or ILECs), and new entrants into telecommunications services (competitive local 
exchange carriers, or CLECs) compete for subscription. Recent rapid technological changes have led to a 
sharp decline in the cost of cable and DSL service. Monthly prices were $27 in many areas in 2004, down 
                                                 
13 FCC (2004) reports most of the statistics we refer to in this section. 
14 1.8 million high-speed lines served residential and small business subscribers as of December 1999 and 26 
millions lines did so as of December 2003. 
15 Asymmetric DSL provide speeds in one direction greater than speeds in the other direction. 
16 Other technologies include: wireline technologies “other” than ADSL, including traditional telephone company 
high-speed services and symmetric DSL services; optical fiber to the subscriber’s premises; and satellite and 
terrestrial wireless systems, which use radio spectrum to communicate with a radio transmitter.   13
from $40 in 2003. Again, the record on prices and technology suggests that the market is characterized by 
rapid changes. 
While many other governments, most notably Korea, are investing heavily in broadband, the 
United States has left broadband investment mostly to private companies. In recent years, the U.S. 
government’s broadband strategy is to foster competition by reducing regulatory hurdles. The idea is to 
encourage entry and competition, which will lower prices and boost broadband use. Whether this strategy 
works or not boils down to examining entry conditions faced by different firms in different times, the 
focus of this study. 
 
3.2 Market  Definition 
In order to determine entry thresholds for providers of high-speed lines, we must first define the 
local market. The definition hinges on the mobility of consumers’ demand. An important advantage of the 
broadband market is that consumers’ demand is certainly local ---- consumers can only order services 
from providers which offer service in their neighborhood. Consequently, we do not face the problem 
common to market structure studies that customers can travel from one market to another, blurring the 
geographic boundaries of a market. 
Our definition of a local market also reflects the type of entry decision on which we focus.  In this 
application, we are not concerned with the decision of whether to enter or exit the broadband service 
market more generally, but only on the marginal decision of whether an already existing provider will 
serve one more local market. Our definition of the geographic boundaries of the market will reflect the 
sunk costs associated with this marginal market entry decision. For example, if the sunk costs of serving a 
new area were confined to local TV and newspaper advertising, we would define the local markets by 
county or city boundaries that reflect the boundaries of the local mass media market.    14
The best definition of a local geographic market for our study is a zip code tabulation area, as 
defined by the 2000 Census of Population. The marginal decision of whether or not to serve one more 
area involves sunk costs that are mostly committed at the zip code level, particularly in the less densely 
populated areas that we focus on in this study. These costs involve application of the so-called “last mile” 
technology that connects the switching and distribution centers of local telecommunications and cable 
television companies to the home users of broadband services. Basically, providers of high-speed lines are 
data transporters in this “last mile” of the network. For DSL services data passes over part of the spectrum 
on copper telephone wires; for cable services data pass over part of the spectrum on the coaxial cable that 
distributes cable television. Because both services are offered over networks designed for other services, 
the providers must make substantial investments in renovation before serving an area. Sunk costs of 
serving an additional area are mainly composed of the renovation costs of the existing networks and the 
costs of building switching and distribution centers (Jackson, 2002). The distance between the user’s 
premises and a phone company’s central office or cable installation is a primary factor in deciding which 
neighborhoods to serve and the speed of these services. DSL is typically available within a radius of 3.5 
miles from the central office,
17 while cable modem service areas are larger.  Based on the 2000 population 
Census, a typical zip code covers a radius of 3 to 4 miles, roughly consistent with the area that could be 
covered by a DSL system. Other possible geographic boundaries such as cities, counties, or MSAs are too 
large relative to a broadband service area, and could include providers that do not actually compete with 
each other. This makes zip code areas the finest approximation of local markets in the broadband 
market.
18 
Above said, we still need to be cautious in dealing with different types of firms and their 
potentially different sunk costs. The 1996 Telecommunications Act and other FCC regulations allow 
                                                 
17 For example, San Francisco has 24 zip code areas and 12 central offices, none of which are more than four miles 
from each other (Prieger, 2003). 
18 Augereau, Greenstein, and Rysman (2004) take local calling areas as distinct markets to study Internet service 
providers’ adoption of different technology standards for 56K modems. In their study, a provider’s technology 
adoption decisions do not vary with zip codes. However, in our study each zip code may have a distinctive set of 
competitors.    15
CLECs to use ILECs’ infrastructure based on the total-element, long-run, incremental cost. Most CLECs 
choose exercising this option over investing in their own network infrastructure and spend large sums of 
money on marketing. This creates a distinction between the sunk costs of CLECs and those of ILECs and 
makes the extension of our baseline model a more meaningful exercise.
19  
We do not focus on the overall decision of whether a given provider enters, remains in, or exits 
business because market distinctions blur. Almost all providers serve multiple areas. A few have national 
or near-national footprints,
20 more offer services beyond one city, and hundreds of small providers only 
cover a small geographic area. Different sized providers will differ in their business strategies regarding 
the scale of geographic markets to cover. Markets defined by the overall broadband entry decision will 
overlap, leading to a variety of competitive interactions. Any two providers might compete with one 
another in some geographic areas and not in the others. Without firm identities and firm-specific coverage 
area in our data, the problem of overlapping markets would be insurmountable if we chose to investigate 
providers’ entry decisions at the firm level.  
  
3.3 The  Data 
Our primary data set is the Survey of High Speed Internet Providers, conducted every six months 
by the National Telecommunications and Information Administration since December 1999. The surveys 
report the number of providers for each zip code in the United States. The Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) requires every facilities-based provider with at least 250 high-speed lines to report 
basic information about its service offerings and end users twice a year to the Commission.
21 Each 
provider is required to report its presence in a given zip code as long as it serves at least one customer in 
                                                 
19 In the extension, we allow sunk costs to vary with the order of entry. If CLECs tend to enter after ILECs in the 
broadband market, which is usually true, this extension will capture the differences in sunk costs between these two 
different types of firms. 
20 For example, Time-Warner America Online. 
21 High-speed lines are defined as those that provide speeds exceeding 200 kilobits per second (kbps) in at least one 
direction.   16
that zip code. The FCC then releases summary statistics to the public aggregated to the zip code level, 
which provides us 9 snapshots of the number of firms competing in each broadband market. Figure 2 
shows that the number of high-speed Internet service providers varies substantially over time, across 
states, and across communities within states.  
The data set is close to “ideal”.
22 First, the providers of high-speed lines market is growing 
rapidly and there is significant entry and exit during the time span of the data. Second, we have a cleaner 
definition of markets than in most of the previous entry studies. The data tell us exactly how many firms 
are competing within a zip code. Because consumers cannot order Internet services from providers not 
servicing their home market, the zip code market boundary is exact. 
   The data has several drawbacks, however. We do not know the identities of the firms, so we can 
only observe net instead of actual entry and exit. It is likely that high-speed Internet services are 
correlated across adjacent zip codes as most providers serve more than a single zip code, but we have no 
way to deal with this potential correlation.
23 Furthermore, cable and DSL are different products that are 
not perfect substitutes, but we are unable to distinguish between them. Mitigating this problem is the 
similarity in cost and structure for DSL and cable modems (Jackson, 2002).
24 Small providers, many of 
which serve sparsely populated areas, are not required to report to FCC, potentially causing measurement 
errors in our econometric analysis.
25 Again fortunately, few providers would fall into this category. 
Research shows that entry will not pay off unless there are at least 200 lines in a DSL service area 
(Paradyne, 2000). The most serious drawback is that the FCC summary data by zip code does not 
distinguish between 1, 2 or 3 providers to avoid violating confidentiality. This prevents us from studying 
the change of competitive conduct from the 1
st to the 3
rd provider.  
                                                 
22 Citing Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), “ideally, we would like to observe a single industry in which market demand 
has fluctuated enough to cause significant firm turnover.” 
23 However, these correlations do not affect the consistency of our estimates (need elaboration). 
24 Jackson (2002) compares the costs of cable versus DSL from all aspects: 1) the cost of modems; 2) the cost of 
connecting to the aggregated traffic; 3) the cost of the transmission plants; 4) the cost of the DSL’s central office and 
the cable system’s head end; 5) the cost of marketing, installation, and customer support. He concludes that the costs 
only differ slightly across the two platforms. 
25 Small providers (with less than 250 high-speed lines) may provide information on a voluntary basis.   17
To complement the main data, we merge in information from the 2000 Population Census based 
on zip code tabulation areas (ZCTAs).
26 Our measure of market size is the population in ZCTAs. In 
addition, we use average income, education, age, ethnicity, commuting distance, population density etc. 
as factors affecting local demand for and/or the cost of providing high-speed Internet services. The zip 
code data are also matched to the Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) codes, which allow us 
to merge in the number of firms per thousand in the county population in 1998. We use this variable from 
the Bureau of Economic Analysis as a proxy for local business activities. 
 
3.4  Sample Selection and Summary Statistics 
While zip code areas provide a good geographic definition for our broadband markets, we need to 
further refine our market definition to ensure: 1) measurement errors in the data are minimized; 2) a 
market covers a large enough geographic area so that sunk costs must be committed to enter; 3) all 
providers in a market are able to compete with each other. To satisfy these conditions, we select a sample 
from the universe of 31913 zip codes in the United States.
27 We first sort the data by population density. 
We drop the bottom 5 percent, which corresponds to very sparsely populated rural areas, where the 
measurement error problem is more severe (see section 3.3). We also drop the top 5 percent, which 
corresponds to metropolitan areas (e.g. San Francisco, New York City) where zip codes may not provide 
a sufficiently large area.
28  For the rest of the zip code areas, we opt for zip codes with populations below 
the median (roughly 2750) to focus on markets that would be more prone toward an oligopoly structure. 
Furthermore, a zip code with populations above the median covers a much larger geographic area and we 
                                                 
26 ZCTAs, defined by the Census Bureau, are not identical to zip codes, defined by the U.S. postal service. However, 
all the zip codes from the FCC data do have a match in the 2000 Census data. 
27 We do not include Puerto Rico zip codes in the universe of the zip codes. We also delete zip code areas with 
“HH” or “XX” as the last two digits. They are specially coded by the Census Bureau to cover large water areas or 
rural areas with few people  (e.g. parks, forest lands, desert, and mountainous areas). 
28 A typical zip code area in this category covers a radius less than 1 mile.   18
are concerned that providers serving such a zip code did not compete with each other.
29 Our selection 
criteria leave us with 14364 zip codes observations per period over 9 semi-annual time periods from 
December 1999 to December 2003.
30   
Table 1 reports summary statistics on the average number of providers and the proportion of zip 
codes experiencing net entry or no net change. As shown here, the number of providers in a zip code area 
has increased monotonically over time. In December 1999, these markets averaged only 0.27 providers 
per market. Four years later, they averaged 1.09 providers per market. There is tremendous variation in 
the distribution of providers. In December 1999, 74% had no providers while others had as many as 9. 
Four years later, 27% had no providers while other markets had as many as 17. Entry and incumbency 
occurred steadily over the nine periods except for a surge of entry during December 2000 and June 2001. 
In every 6 month time period, around 10% of the zip codes added at least one more net provider. Around 
85% had no net change in providers, leaving the residual 5% losing at least one provider.  
Table 2 reports the proportion of zip codes with various numbers of providers in each of the 
periods. There was considerable entry over the four years. Almost 50% of the zip codes experienced a 
first entrant during the period. The most significant growth was in the 1 to 3 provider category, with the 
share of zip codes in that group rising from 26% to 64% over the period. 
Table 3 describes demographic variables previously identified by Prieger (2003) as relevant to 
market profitability. On average, our zip code markets have a population of 1018 with a land area of 53 
square miles.
31 The vast majority are White, with 5% African American, 4% Hispanic, 2% Native 
American, and 0.4% Asian. Median household income average $35 thousand with 38% percent of the 
population having had at least some college education. One-third of the population is over 60. Around 5% 
                                                 
29 We can show that there is strong positive correlation between population residing in a ZCTA and the area size of 
this ZCTA when metropolitan ZCTAs are dropped from the sample. 
30 We have tried some different cutoff points in all steps of selecting the sample (specifically, dropping the top and 
bottom 10% based on population density and/or dropping zip codes with populations below [2500, 4000]). The 
results are similar.  
31 The population density is 189 per square mile on average. Note, the population density is a non-linear function of 
population and land area, therefore the mean of the population density is different from the mean of population 
divided by the mean of land area.   19
of the working population work at home, while around 20% have to spend more than 40 minutes 
commuting to work. Around 20% of households rent, and the vast majority (96%) have a telephone at 
home. Because of our sample selection criteria, 92 % of the population is rural. On average, there are 24 
firms per thousand in the population. 
 
4.  RESULTS 
  A closer look at the data can give us an idea why the static BR framework cannot be applied to an 
industry with significant growth. Table 4 reports the percentage of all the zip codes with n  firms that 
experienced net entry or no net change over each 6 month period under study. As of June 2000, 31.7% of 
the markets with 1 to 3 providers gained at least one provider. The percentage decreases over time so that 
by December 2003, only 7.5% of the markets with 1 to 3 firms had experienced net entry over the 
previous six months.  The rest of the categories display a similar pattern, but the change over time is 
much smaller. This suggests that entry into the 1 to 3 provider category happens much earlier than entry 
into other categories. While markets with  4 n >  providers still experience significant entry at the end of 
the time period, markets with 1 to 3 providers are composed mostly of incumbents. In that group, 91% 
experienced no net entry or exit in the six-month period ending in December 2003. Without considering 
the sunk costs which only entrants have to incur, the BR framework will generate a weighted average of 
the “true” entry threshold and a smaller, “incumbency” threshold----the market size that allows the 
th n  
incumbent firm to remain in business. Therefore, the BR replication results will underestimate entry 
thresholds for all categories, with the bias most significant for the category with 1-3 firms toward the end 
of our survey period when incumbents dominate the sample. We conjecture that the BR framework will 





, especially in the later periods as incumbency 
dominates. 
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4.1    Replication of the Bresnahan and Reiss Framework 
  Table 5 reports estimates from the ordered Probit model using the BR framework. Note for each 
regression a normalization of the variance of the error term has been made so we cannot compare 
coefficients across time periods. The vast majority of coefficient estimates are as one would hypothesize 
about factors that shift profitability in the broadband market. Population size is a significant determinant 
of the number of providers operating in a zip code. Zip codes with a higher percentage of Hispanics and 
Native Americans discourage the presence of broadband providers, while a higher percentage of Asians 
raises the number of providers. Evidence of the impact of Black populations is mixed. Richer and better-
educated populations attract more providers, while zip codes with larger households,
32 more females, and 
more senior citizens discourage them. Populations that rent, have a telephone at home, work at home, or 
have longer commuting distances attract broadband services. Rural areas attract fewer providers, while 
areas with more prosperous businesses activity, as measured by firm density, attract more. All these 
coefficients are stable over time and most of them are statistically significant. The only puzzle is that 
population density lowers the number of providers as one would think that the cost of providing Internet 
services should be lower in more densely-populated areas.  
In table 5, the cutoff points  nt µ  are estimated with very good precision. Table 6a and 6b are 
calculated based on the estimates of the coefficients and cutoff points in table 5. Table 6a reports the 
absolute entry thresholds derived from 
   
 








= . The entry threshold indicates the market size 
necessary to support n  firms at time t, as measured by population size in thousands. Note that these 
thresholds are comparable across time periods because they are defined as ratios of coefficients, and so 
the units cancel out. As time goes by, less population is necessary to support a given number of providers. 
As shown in the table, around 2,400 people are necessary for a zip code area to support 1 to 3 providers in 
                                                 
32 People in the same household usually share one broadband provider so larger households reduce effective 
demand.   21
December 1999, while only 186 people are necessary in December 2003. Similarly, around 7,100 people 
are necessary to support 4 providers in December 1999 but only 2800 in December 2003. The rapid 
reduction in the number of people necessary to support a given number of providers suggests either that 
broadband demand is growing rapidly over the four years, that technology is rapidly lowering production 
cost, or both.  
Table 6b reports the entry threshold ratios calculated from 







= . They are also 






+ = , there is no change in competitive 
conduct in moving from n  to  1 n+  firms in the zip code area. 
Recall that our data cannot distinguish whether there are 1, 2, or 3 providers in a given zip code. 



































we generate a measure that lies between the two extremes. We assume that there is no change in 
competitive conduct in moving from a monopoly market to a 3-firm market, i.e., we assume  123 sss = = . 
Under that assumption, 13 1 1 2 2 3 3 1 1 2 3 *2 *3 * * (23 ) Ss P s P s P s P P P − =+ + = + + , where  n P  is the 
percentage of providers in the 
th n category ( 1, 2, 3 no r = ) among all 1 to 3 firm oligopoly market. The 
FCC does report the distribution of 1-, 2- and 3-provider markets at the national level for every period, 
and we use this distribution data as our measures of  1 P , 2 P , and 3 P . Given that approximation, we 
define
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as measuring the average change in competitive conduct when the 4
th firm enters a 1-3 firm 
oligopoly market.
34 





+  are close to unity with only slight increases over time, 
suggesting that competitive conduct is stable when market structure goes beyond 4 firms. There are huge 











. For both, the threshold ratios rise over time, suggesting 
that entry into a 1-3 firm oligopoly market gets progressively more difficult over time. Using the revised 
measures, whereas in December 1999, competitive conduct seems not to change appreciably as the 4
th 
firm is added, by December 2001 it takes nearly twice the 1-3 firm market size to support the 4
th entrant, 
and by December 2003, it takes around 7.5 times the market size. A similar pattern occurs with the 
unrevised measure that is subject to greater downward bias. The implication is that firms are finding it 
increasingly difficult to enter the broadband markets with less than four incumbent firms.  
 
4.2    Results of Our Baseline Model 
  The construction of table 7, 8a, and 8b is the same as table 5, 6a, and 6b. Table 7 reports MLE 
results from our baseline model; table 8a reports entry thresholds measured in population; table 8b reports 
entry threshold ratios. Comparing table 7 and table 5, we can see that the coefficient estimates for the 
control variables are very close. The estimated effect of population on the number of providers steadily 
increases over time in table 7, but the increase is modest in magnitude compared to the much more rapid 
increase in table 5. We suspect that this is because the population coefficient absorbs some of the ignored 
                                                 
34 We sometimes omit the t  subscript following  n s , when n  takes a number, to simplify notion.   23
effects of entry costs in the BR framework. Because of the normalizations we employ for every time 
period, we are not able to further investigate this conjecture.  
Though the coefficients between table 5 and table 7 are not comparable due to the normalizations 
we have made, there are two major differences worthy of our attention.  First, the cutoff points  nt µ  in 
table 7 are much smaller in magnitude. Second, in table 7 entry cost  t SC  is estimated. Both  nt µ  and  t SC  
are precisely estimated. Their combined magnitudes roughly match the magnitudes of the estimates of 
nt µ  in table 5. 
As we discussed earlier, we expected that the BR framework would underestimate entry 
thresholds by ignoring entry costs, especially for entry into the 1-3 firm category and that the bias would 
increase later in the period as incumbents increased in proportion to the total number of firms. Table 8a 
confirms our predictions. Every threshold reported here is larger than its counterpart in table 6a. By 
December 1999, the population necessary to support a 1-3 firm oligopoly was 3,606, while the BR 
estimate was 2,420; by December 2003, the population necessary to support the same market structure 
was 2,024 rather than 186 as implied by the BR estimate. These patterns are the same for all other market 
structures. In other words, the BR framework generates a downward bias in estimating entry thresholds. 
Figure 3 is a graphical illustration of this bias, which can be measured by the gap between the solid and 
dotted line for the same market structure category. For clarity we only show estimates for  13 n =− and 
4 n = . We can see that the bias falls in June 2001 when there was a surge of entry. Then the bias jumps 
in magnitude in December 2001 when new firm entry dropped and the incumbent share rose sharply. The 
bias is especially large for  13 n =− in later periods, exactly as we have conjectured. 

































, hinting that the competitive conduct from a 1-3 firm oligopoly to a 4-firm market indeed 
changed slightly over time (for a comparison of the BR replication results and our baseline model’ results 











 and is theoretically bounded 
above unity, there seems to be no change of the entry conditions for the 4
th entrant from a 3-firm market 
structure. Therefore, though we are not able to infer the competitive conduct change inside the 1-to-3 firm 
category due to data limitations, we are safe to conclude that the fringe players from the 4
th firm on have 
little effect on the competitive conduct of the broadband market.   
 In table 9, we test formally for systematic differences in entry threshold ratios over time. We use 
likelihood ratio tests to examine whether entry threshold ratios remain unchanged from period  1 t −  to t. 









= , we constrain  nt µ  to be a function of other 
coefficients and obtain the new log likelihood under the constraint. There is a statistically significant 
change over time in competitive conduct from a 1-3 firm oligopoly to a 4-firm market. Moreover, this 
change shows some, if not huge, economical significance as shown in table 8b, implying the entry 
conditions for the 4
th firm has indeed changed somewhat over the fours years of our observation.   
Furthermore, in June 2003 the change from last period is statistically significant for every category, 
showing that the period from December 2002 and June 2003 displays more conduct change than any other 
period.   
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4.3    Do Entry Costs Vary with the Order of Entry? 
Table 10a and 10b reports results from the first extension of our baseline model, which allows 
entry costs to vary with the order of entry. Table 10c reports likelihood ratio tests for the null hypotheses 
13 , 4 5 6 7 ttttt SC SC SC SC SC − ==== and  13 , 4 5 6 7 ttttt SC SC SC SC SC − ≠ ===. Our baseline model is 
the most restrictive model. In table 10a, we allow the sunk costs of entrants into the 1-3 firm oligopoly 
market to be different from the later entrants. In table 10b, we allow the sunk costs of the 4
th entrant to be 
different as well. As most coefficient estimates are very close to the baseline model, we only report 
estimates for the entry costs  nt SC . The pattern of estimates in both tables is that sunk entry costs into the 
1-3 firm oligopoly market are smaller than for later entrants, but only for the early time periods. 
Furthermore, table 10c shows that we can reject the null hypotheses 
13 , 4 5 6 7 ttttt SC SC SC SC SC − ==== but cannot reject  13 , 4 5 6 7 ttttt SC SC SC SC SC − ≠ === for these 
early periods.  These test results support the findings in table 10a and 10b, i.e. in early broadband market 
the entrants into the 1- to 3- firm oligopoly market has distinctively different entry costs than the later 
entrants. As Greenstein (2000) argues, many small and medium providers took strategic positions as early 
movers into new technology and new services as a way to develop local customer bases and differentiate 
from their branded national rivals. Our evidences support his argument: early mover advantages seem to 
discount entry costs for early entrants into the broadband market, or put it another way, increase the 
“strategic” entry costs for later entrants. 
 
4.4    How Important is County-specific Heterogeneity? 
Table 11a, 11b, and 11c reports results from the second extension of our baseline model, which 
allows county-level random effects. As table 11a shows, the variance of the country-specific error  county η  
is estimated with high precision. Comparing table 7 and table 11a, we can see that controlling for random   26
effects greatly improves the log likelihood. Though table 11a suggests the importance of allowing 
profitability of adjacent markets to be correlated, table 11b and 11c suggests otherwise. In table 11b and 
11c, the estimated entry thresholds and entry threshold ratios only change very little from table 8a and 8b. 
In fact, all the structural parameters and their variances are very closely estimated with or without county-
level random effects. This is not surprising: our baseline model already produces consistent estimators 
and the random effects model can only improve efficiency. With our large sample of zip codes, the 
baseline model is already estimated with good precision. If the sample size is small and parameters are 
less precisely estimated, we suspect that incorporating market random effects might play a more 
significant role. The relative ease with which market-level heterogeneity can be incorporated into our 
adapted BR framework will help in future investigations of markets structures that have more limited 
samples.  
 
5.  CONCLUSIONS  
In this paper we incorporate sunk costs into an empirical framework estimating a discrete game of 
firm entry and exit. Application of our framework to a fast evolving market ---- the broadband market 
from 1999 to 2003 ---- displays a drastically different picture from the one well established in the 
literature. The huge variations in the changes of competitive conduct when the 4
th firm enters exist only as 
an artifact of disregarding entry and exit in the empirical framework. Our results show that there are only 
small variations of entry threshold ratios. Once the market has between one to three firms, the next entrant 
has little effect on competitive conduct in the local broadband market. Our work highlights the 
importance of sunk costs in determining entry conditions and inferences about firm conduct. 
An immediate next step to this paper should allow for entrants’ expectation of the evolution of 
future market structure.  For example, firms may have a greater incentive to be among the first set of 
entrants if they expect that the market will support a stable oligopoly market structure rather than   27
inducing additional entry that quickly dissipates rents. This “preemption” behavior is beyond the 
capability of our current framework and warrants future research.  
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Table 1   Summary Statistics on Firm Entry, Exit, and Incumbency  
    
 
Variable Mean  Standard 
Error  Min Max 
Number of providers in a zip code market  
Dec 1999  0.274  0.519  0  9 
Jun 2000  0.364  0.602  0  11 
Dec 2000  0.485  0.795  0  15 
Jun 2001  0.562  0.850  0  14 
Dec 2001  0.597  0.885  0  14 
Jun 2002  0.724  1.034  0  16 
Dec 2002  0.827  1.106  0  17 
Jun 2003  0.976  1.282  0  16 
Dec 2003  1.087  1.377  0  17 
Zip code market has net entry in the 6 month period (yes=1, no=0) 
Dec 1999—Jun 2000  0.111  0.314  0  1 
Jun 2000—Dec 2000  0.114  0.318  0  1 
Dec 2000—Jun 2001  0.134  0.341  0  1 
Jun 2001—Dec 2001  0.086  0.280  0  1 
Dec 2001—Jun 2002  0.115  0.319  0  1 
Jun 2002—Dec 2002  0.114  0.318  0  1 
Dec 2002—Jun 2003  0.109  0.311  0  1 
Jun 2003—Dec 2003  0.090  0.286  0  1 
Zip code market has no net entry or exit in the 6 month period (yes =1, no=0) 
Dec 1999—Jun 2000  0.863  0.344  0  1 
Jun 2000—Dec 2000  0.864  0.343  0  1 
Dec 2000—Jun 2001  0.798  0.402  0  1 
Jun 2001—Dec 2001  0.854  0.353  0  1 
Dec 2001—Jun 2002  0.860  0.347  0  1 
Jun 2002—Dec 2002  0.852  0.355  0  1 
Dec 2002—Jun 2003  0.867  0.340  0  1 
Jun 2003—Dec 2003  0.886  0.318  0  1   32
Table 2   Percentage of Zip Codes with n  Firms  
 
 
 Dec99  Jun00  Dec00  Jun01  Dec01 Jun02  Dec02 Jun03  Dec03 
0 n =   73.95 65.86   57.78  51.78 49.72 42.40 35.67   30.79    26.96 
13 n =−  25.72 33.59   40.70  46.24 47.87 53.86 59.64   61.83    63.67 
4 n =    0.17   0.31   0.92   1.25   1.55   2.38   3.08   4.85   6.02 
5 n =    0.06   0.08   0.24   0.31   0.40   0.63   0.81   1.44   1.99 
6 n =    0.04   0.06   0.13   0.16   0.17   0.29   0.27   0.40   0.56 
7 n ≥    0.05   0.10   0.23   0.26   0.30   0.42   0.53   0.70   0.80 




Table 3   Summary Statistics of Zip Code Demographics  
 
 
Variable Definition  Mean*  Standard 
Error  Min Max 
pop/1000  # people living in a zip code, in 
thousands  1.018 0.742  0.001  2.729 
% Black  % population: African Americans  0.050  0.141  0  1 
% Hispanic  % population: Hispanics  0.037  0.103  0  1 
% Native  % population: Native American   0.022  0.110  0  1 
% Asian  % population: Asians  0.004  0.024  0  1 
m_income  Household median income  35443  13542  0  200k 
% college  % population over 25 with some 
college education   0.383 0.156  0  1 
hh_size  Average household size  2.563  0.340  0  10.25 
% female  % population: females  0.498  0.039  0  1 
% senior  % population over 60  0.327  0.086  0  1 
% w_home  % working population over 16 
working at home   0.054 0.058  0  1 
% long_cmu 
% working population over 16 
spending more than 40 minutes on 
commuting  
0.204 0.137  0  1 
% rent  % households renting  0.201  0.118  0  1 
% phone  % households with a telephone at 
home  0.956 0.063  0  1 
% rural  % population living in rural areas  0.921  0.249  0  1 
firm density  # firms per thousand of population in 
county, 1998  23.985 6.890  3.196  102.67 
land area  square miles of land area  53.76  74.02  0.002  918.45 
pop density  # people per square mile  188.8  539.2  2.6  5221 
 
*: This column reports the simple-average of variables across zip codes.   33
Table 4   Patterns on Firm Entry and Incumbency over Time 
 
  Jun00 Dec00  Jun01 Dec01  Jun02 Dec02  Jun03 Dec03 
% of n -firm Markets with Net Entry 
Markets with   
0 n =    0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00 
13 n =−  31.73 25.01 26.18   15.15  17.18 15.07 10.60   7.49 
4 n =   77.27 87.88 71.11   58.11  62.28 54.07 58.76 42.13 
5 n =   72.73 91.43 75.00   59.65  70.33 59.83 69.57 57.34 
6 n =   77.78 83.33 52.17   62.50  57.14 48.72 75.86 65.43 
7 n ≥   66.67 57.58 28.95   27.91  37.70 26.32 25.00 19.13 
% of n -firm Markets with No Net Entry/Exit 
Markets with   
0 n =   96.09 96.35 88.21 89.54 95.40 93.68 94.60 96.44 
13 n =−  68.12 74.87 72.58 83.54 82.12 83.49 88.50 90.95 
4 n =   18.18 10.61 23.33 34.23 33.92 38.69 37.50 51.74 
5 n =   18.18   5.71  15.91 24.56 25.27 33.33 26.57 36.71 
6 n =   11.11 11.11 21.74 16.67 30.95 41.03 24.14 30.86 
7 n ≥   33.33 42.42 71.05 72.09 62.30 73.68 75.00 80.87 
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Table 5   Ordered Probit Results for BR Replication 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
  Dec99  Jun00 Dec00  Jun01 Dec01  Jun02 Dec02  Jun03 Dec03 
pop/1000  0.507 0.575 0.649 0.832 0.850 0.902 0.945 0.950 0.971 
  (0.016)*** (0.016)*** (0.015)*** (0.016)*** (0.016)*** (0.016)*** (0.017)*** (0.017)*** (0.017)*** 
% Black  -0.169 -0.382 -0.146 -0.009 -0.033 0.091  0.216  0.105  0.134 
  (0.098)*  (0.095)***  (0.087)*  (0.087) (0.085) (0.083) (0.082)***  (0.081) (0.080)* 
% Hispanic  -0.495 -0.509 -0.170 0.158  0.085  -0.222 -0.185 -0.355 -0.501 
  (0.142)*** (0.134)*** (0.119)  (0.116)  (0.115)  (0.113)*  (0.111)*  (0.110)*** (0.110)*** 
% Native  -0.540 -0.578 -0.886 -0.733 -0.222 -0.284 -0.191 -0.196 -0.143 
  (0.176)*** (0.163)*** (0.161)*** (0.146)*** (0.128)*  (0.123)**  (0.121)  (0.119)*  (0.116) 
% Asian  1.225 0.903 1.404 1.576 0.405 1.513 1.737 1.541 1.414 
  (0.427)*** (0.416)**  (0.405)*** (0.406)*** (0.411)  (0.405)*** (0.409)*** (0.405)*** (0.406)*** 
ln(m_incom)  0.305 0.333 0.439 0.575 0.517 0.594 0.549 0.557 0.573 
  (0.051)*** (0.048)*** (0.046)*** (0.047)*** (0.046)*** (0.045)*** (0.044)*** (0.043)*** (0.043)*** 
% college  0.357 0.718 0.563 0.931 0.812 0.544 0.533 0.518 0.333 
  (0.103)*** (0.097)*** (0.094)*** (0.095)*** (0.093)*** (0.091)*** (0.090)*** (0.088)*** (0.088)*** 
hh_size  -0.112 -0.172 -0.219 -0.287 -0.282 -0.308 -0.320 -0.265 -0.236 
  (0.052)**  (0.049)*** (0.048)*** (0.047)*** (0.046)*** (0.045)*** (0.044)*** (0.044)*** (0.043)*** 
% female  -1.648 -1.386 -1.135 -1.421 -1.366 -1.592 -1.452 -1.381 -1.357 
  (0.312)*** (0.299)*** (0.286)*** (0.286)*** (0.283)*** (0.278)*** (0.277)*** (0.273)*** (0.272)*** 
% senior  0.148  -0.008 -0.288 -0.077 -0.159 -0.370 -0.386 -0.192 -0.398 
  (0.189) (0.180) (0.175)*  (0.175) (0.173) (0.170)**  (0.169)**  (0.165) (0.164)** 
% w_home  0.532 0.387 0.092 0.441 0.346 0.474 0.536 0.511 0.573 
  (0.234)** (0.222)*  (0.216)  (0.213)** (0.211)  (0.206)** (0.205)***  (0.201)** (0.200)***   35
% long_cmu  0.894 0.974 0.847 0.284 0.326 0.234 0.367 0.350 0.177 
  (0.094)*** (0.090)*** (0.086)*** (0.089)*** (0.088)*** (0.086)*** (0.084)*** (0.083)*** (0.082)** 
% rent  0.606 1.038 0.830 1.239 1.204 1.129 1.094 1.143 1.143 
  (0.119)*** (0.114)*** (0.110)*** (0.109)*** (0.108)*** (0.106)*** (0.105)*** (0.103)*** (0.102)*** 
% phone  0.995 1.042 0.790 0.411 -0.011  0.119 0.481 0.713 0.877 
  (0.288)*** (0.271)*** (0.251)*** (0.249)*  (0.230)  (0.223)  (0.221)**  (0.218)*** (0.215)*** 
% rural  -0.568 -0.385 -0.423 -0.421 -0.454 -0.463 -0.502 -0.573 -0.557 
  (0.058)*** (0.056)*** (0.054)*** (0.056)*** (0.055)*** (0.054)*** (0.054)*** (0.053)*** (0.052)*** 
firm density  0.008 0.012 0.004 -0.002  0.002 -0.000  0.002 0.003 0.004 
  (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)**  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)*  (0.002)** 
ln(pop_dsty)  -0.006 0.012  -0.007 -0.095 -0.083 -0.100 -0.142 -0.179 -0.196 
  (0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)***  (0.010)***  (0.009)***  (0.009)***  (0.009)***  (0.009)*** 
           
13 µ −   4.310 5.159 5.367 5.873 4.859 5.127 4.737 5.007 4.982 
  (0.412)*** (0.327)*** (0.276)*** (0.251)*** (0.255)*** (0.228)*** (0.217)*** (0.195)*** (0.189)*** 
4 µ   6.713 7.699 7.728 8.419 7.357 7.657 7.380 7.543 7.521 
  (0.340)*** (0.268)*** (0.242)*** (0.223)*** (0.232)*** (0.209)*** (0.200)*** (0.183)*** (0.179)*** 
5 µ   7.004 8.051 8.164 8.911 7.865 8.184 7.948 8.159 8.145 
  (0.328)*** (0.235)*** (0.221)*** (0.201)*** (0.213)*** (0.197)*** (0.187)*** (0.174)*** (0.173)*** 
6 µ   7.187 8.206 8.390 9.148 8.137 8.476 8.271 8.555 8.584 
  (0.362)*** (0.279)*** (0.236)*** (0.218)*** (0.219)*** (0.204)*** (0.184)*** (0.169)*** (0.170)*** 
7 µ   7.378 8.383 8.561 9.342 8.312 8.698 8.442 8.746 8.809 
  (0.425)*** (0.341)*** (0.291)*** (0.266)*** (0.267)*** (0.239)*** (0.227)*** (0.205)*** (0.199)*** 
           
ln L  -7656.7 -8465.2 -9460.4 -9260.6 -9556.4 -9970.5 -9938.7  -10625.3  -10975.7 
Note: Numbers in parenthesis are standard errors for all tables reporting estimation results. * significant at 10% level, ** significant at 5%, and *** significant 
at 1%.  Table 6a  Entry Thresholds: BR Replication Results 
 
 
Population (in thousands) Necessary to Support n  firms 
  Dec99 Jun00 Dec00 Jun01 Dec01 Jun02 Dec02 Jun03 Dec03 
13 n =−  2.420 1.828 1.363 1.082 0.999 0.738 0.510 0.330 0.186 
4 n =   7.132 6.228 4.991 4.137 3.930 3.536 3.303 2.995 2.797 
5 n =   7.702 6.839 5.663 4.728 4.527 4.119 3.903 3.643 3.439 
6 n =   8.062 7.108 6.010 5.012 4.846 4.442 4.245 4.059 3.891 








Table 6b  Entry Threshold Ratios: BR Replication Results 
 
 


























  0.897 0.894 0.895  0.897  0.893 0.905 0.893 0.899 0.908 
 
Note: We calculate entry thresholds (table 6a) and entry threshold ratios (table 6b) using the coefficient estimates in 
table 5. We also calculate the standard errors for entry thresholds and entry threshold ratios using the Delta method. 
In table 6a and 6b, all estimates are at least significant at 10% level; the majority of them are significant at 1% level. 
To save space, we do not report standard errors in these tables. Similarly, we do not report standard errors in table 








 Table 7   MLE Results for the Baseline Model 
  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Jun00  Dec00  Jun01  Dec01  Jun02 Dec02  Jun03 Dec03 
pop/1000   0.411   0.463   0.659   0.514   0.574   0.593   0.595   0.597 
  ( 0.020)***   (0.020)***   (0.018)***   (0.020)***   (0.021)***   (0.021)***   (0.021)***   (0.023)*** 
% Black  -0.371   0.170   0.136   0.033   0.238   0.354  -0.049   0.166 
   (0.119)***   (0.093)*   (0.093)   (0.101)   (0.104)**   (0.093)***   (0.096)   (0.103) 
% Hispanic  -0.305   0.216   0.378   0.024  -0.450  -0.017  -0.211  -0.398 
   (0.180)*   (0.131)   (0.139)***   (0.148)   (0.127)***   (0.143)   (0.144)   (0.163)** 
% Native   -0.388 -0.863 -0.429   0.281 -0.221   0.031 -0.071   0.027 
   (0.225)*   (0.230)***   (0.154)***   (0.134)**   (0.152)   (0.163)   (0.167)   (0.153) 
% Asian   0.567   1.971   1.421  -0.527   1.932   1.039   0.824   0.398 
   (0.428)   (0.321)***   (0.350)***   (0.325)   (0.318)***   (0.428)**   (0.462)*   (0.525) 
ln(m_incom)   0.270   0.429   0.480   0.269   0.484   0.316   0.420   0.398 
   (0.049)***   (0.047)***   (0.038)***   (0.051)***   (0.043)***   (0.043)***   (0.041)***   (0.046)*** 
% college   0.792   0.177   0.949   0.363   0.096   0.327   0.356  -0.055 
   (0.115)***   (0.113)   (0.099)***   (0.112)***   (0.105)   (0.108)***   (0.103)***   (0.111) 
hh_size  -0.243 -0.243 -0.254 -0.231 -0.246 -0.223 -0.118 -0.102 
   (0.061)***   (0.051)***   (0.042)***   (0.046)***   (0.049)***   (0.052)***   (0.050)**   (0.062) 
% female  -0.825 -0.694 -1.239 -1.124 -1.289 -0.989 -0.880 -0.788 
   (0.296)***   (0.272)**   (0.275)***   (0.286)***   (0.259)***   (0.259)***   (0.274)***   (0.338)** 
% senior  -0.211 -0.583   0.080 -0.220 -0.454 -0.159   0.161 -0.433 
   (0.210)   (0.197)***   (0.182)   (0.196)   (0.196)**   (0.203)   (0.198)   (0.235)* 
% w_home   0.149  -0.022   0.569   0.215   0.450   0.432   0.131   0.401 
   (0.247)   (0.249)   (0.257)**   (0.245)   (0.232)*   (0.271)   (0.275)   (0.315) 
% long_cmu   0.693   0.427  -0.164   0.296   0.066   0.408   0.226  -0.178 
   (0.121)***   (0.115)***   (0.102)   (0.110)***   (0.110)   (0.104)***   (0.109)**   (0.118)   38
% rent   1.224   0.488   1.158   0.836   0.697   0.846   0.874   0.746 
   (0.130)***   (0.116)***   (0.105)***   (0.120)***   (0.111)***   (0.110)***   (0.109)***   (0.120)*** 
% phone   0.589   0.216  -0.135  -0.354   0.128   0.707   0.642   0.683 
   (0.315)*   (0.309)   (0.270)   (0.250)   (0.270)   (0.300)**   (0.274)**   (0.331)** 
% rural  -0.107 -0.440 -0.374 -0.372 -0.424 -0.437 -0.507 -0.372 
   (0.075)   (0.070)***   (0.066)***   (0.071)***   (0.067)***   (0.066)***   (0.066)***   (0.070)*** 
firm density   0.011  -0.006  -0.006   0.005  -0.001   0.005   0.004   0.004 
   (0.002)***   (0.002)***   (0.002)***   (0.002)**   (0.002)   (0.002)**   (0.002)*   (0.002)* 
ln(pop_dsty)    0.022 -0.022 -0.129 -0.032 -0.065 -0.117 -0.127 -0.109 
   (0.013)   (0.013)   (0.012)***   (0.013)**   (0.013)***   (0.013)***   (0.013)***   (0.014)*** 
          
13 µ −    2.467   2.186   3.014   0.714   2.214   1.474   2.533   1.977 
   (0.493)***   (0.499)***   (0.375)***   (0.502)***   (0.426)***   (0.408)***   (0.398)***   (0.446)*** 
4 µ    4.366   3.713   4.878   2.216   3.762   3.131   3.886   3.320 
   (0.448)***   (0.477)***   (0.356)***   (0.496)***   (0.415)***   (0.400)***   (0.392)***   (0.440)*** 
5 µ    4.731   4.152   5.353   2.688   4.243   3.647   4.424   3.815 
   (0.422)***   (0.462)***   (0.342)***   (0.490)***   (0.407)***   (0.393)***   (0.388)***   (0.440)*** 
6 µ    4.893   4.407   5.618   2.987   4.560   3.988   4.843   4.254 
   (0.468)***   (0.476)***   (0.359)***   (0.499)***   (0.414)***   (0.391)***   (0.386)***   (0.441)*** 
7 µ    5.099   4.608   5.840   3.213   4.816   4.169   5.097   4.551 
   (0.519)***   (0.522)***   (0.402)***   (0.528)***   (0.445)***   (0.430)***   (0.417)***   (0.465)*** 
t SC    2.208   2.387   1.684   2.044   2.382   2.247   2.486   2.702 
   (0.032)***   (0.033)***   (0.027)***   (0.028)***   (0.033)***   (0.030)***   (0.033)***   (0.035)*** 
          
ln L  -5544.2 -5869.3 -6992.2 -6289.6 -6050.6 -6208.6 -6340.5 -5783.3  
 
Table 8a  Entry Thresholds: the Baseline Model 
 
 
Population (in thousands) Needed to Support n  firms 
 Jun00  Dec00  Jun01  Dec01  Jun02 Dec02 Jun03 Dec03 
13 n =−  3.606 3.101 2.124 2.829 2.239 1.942 1.979 2.024 
4 n =   8.220 6.403 4.954 5.748 4.934 4.734 4.252 4.271 
5 n =   9.107 7.352 5.676 6.666 5.772 5.604 5.157 5.100 
6 n =   9.501 7.904 6.078 7.247 6.324 6.178 5.861 5.836 
7 n ≥   10.001  8.336 6.415 7.687 6.769 6.483 6.288 6.333 
 
Note: We calculate entry thresholds (Table 8a) and entry threshold ratios (Table 8b) using the coefficient 
estimates in table 7. We also calculate the standard errors for entry thresholds and entry threshold ratios using 
the Delta method. In table 8a and 8b, all estimates are at least significant at 10% level; the majority of them are 




Figure 3  Entry Thresholds over Time 
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Table 8b  Entry Threshold Ratios: the Baseline Model 
 
 






























Figure 4  Entry Threshold Ratios over Time 







































































































 Table 9   Likelihood Ratio Tests for Constant Entry Threshold Ratios over Time 
 
 
  Dec00 Jun01 Dec01 Jun02 Dec02 Jun03 Dec03 
Test for 
4, 1 4







=   0.022 14.960***  9.139***  4.599**  2.037  0.461  0.910 
Test for 
4, 1 4




s revised s revised
−
−− −






























=   0.777 4.165** 0.541  2.687  0.852  9.631***  2.635 
  
Table 10a  MLE Results: Extension 1,  13 , 4 5 6 7 ttttt SC SC SC SC SC − ≠ === 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Jun00 Dec00 Jun01 Dec01 Jun02 Dec02 Jun03 Dec03 
13 , t SC −   2.199 2.377 1.661 2.038 2.372 2.248 2.492 2.872 









  2.722 2.732 1.995 2.101 2.449 2.243 2.465 2.429 
  (0.210)*** (0.187)*** (0.094)*** (0.082)*** (0.086)*** (0.066)*** (0.063)*** (0.054)***
          
ln L  -5541.8 -5867.7 -6986.4 -6289.3 -6050.3 -6208.6 -6340.4 -5760.1 
 
 
Table 10b  MLE Results: Extension 1,  13 , 4 5 6 7 ttttt SC SC SC SC SC − ≠ ≠== 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Jun00 Dec00 Jun01 Dec01 Jun02 Dec02 Jun03 Dec03 
13 , t SC −   2.199 2.377 1.660 2.037 2.371 2.247 2.490 2.872 
  (0.033)*** (0.034)*** (0.028)*** (0.029)*** (0.034)*** (0.033)*** (0.036)*** (0.042)***
4t SC   2.702 2.651 1.921 2.072 2.400 2.208 2.409 2.422 









  2.761 2.834 2.210 2.196 2.559 2.334 2.587 2.445 
  (0.276)*** (0.229)*** (0.124)*** (0.112)*** (0.114)*** (0.092)*** (0.084)*** (0.071)***
          
ln L  -5541.8 -5867.3 -6982.0 -6288.5 -6048.9 -6207.2 -6337.7 -5760.0 
 
 
Table 10c  Likelihood Ratio Tests for Entry Costs Proportionality 
 
 Jun00  Dec00  Jun01  Dec01 Jun02 Dec02 Jun03  Dec03 
Test for 
13 , 4 5 6 7 ttttt SC SC SC SC SC − ==== 
 
4.667** 3.054* 11.665*** 0.564 0.755 0.005  0.005  46.448***
Test for 
13 , 4 5 6 7 ttttt SC SC SC SC SC − ≠=== 
 
0.075 0.847  8.791***  1.721  2.685  2.812*  2.812** 0.143 
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Table 11a  MLE Results: Extension 2, Allowing County-level Random Effects 
  
 
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Jun00  Dec00  Jun01  Dec01  Jun02 Dec02 Jun03 Dec03 
2
county σ   0.867  0.697 0.560 0.652 0.462 0.443 0.450 0.489 
  (0.016)** (0.016)*** (0.015)*** (0.016)*** (0.017)*** (0.016)*** (0.016)*** (0.017)***
           




Table 11b  Entry Thresholds: Extension 2, Allowing County-level Random Effects 
 
 
Population (in thousands) Needed to Support n  firms 
 Jun00  Dec00  Jun01  Dec01  Jun02 Dec02 Jun03 Dec03 
13 n =−  3.720 3.071 2.170 2.898 2.223 1.926 1.946 1.969 
4 n =   8.249 6.514 5.123 5.928 4.957 4.743 4.241 4.220 
5 n =   9.034 7.462 5.868 6.846 5.815 5.611 5.152 5.044 
6 n =   9.388 8.000 6.307 7.431 6.386 6.188 5.879 5.775 
7 n ≥   9.839 8.422 6.671 7.877 6.848 6.496 6.314 6.281 
 
 
Table 11c  Entry Threshold Ratios: Extension 2, Allowing County-level Random Effects 
 


























  0.898 0.902 0.907 0.908 0.919 0.900 0.921 0.932 
 
Note: In table 11b and 11c, all estimates are at least significant at 10% level; the majority of them are 
significant at 1% level. 
 